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Abstract: David Gordon was, at once, a highly creative economist with an enormous range of
interests, while also uncompromising in maintaining rigorous research standards. He was
focused equally on hard-core academic research and pressing policy issues. He was also openly
committed to the political left, with this commitment animating all his work. One distinctive
feature of Gordon’s work was his keenness to dive into the most important topics engaging
mainstream economists and to inject explicitly left political economy perspectives into these
mainstream debates. This paper focuses on two important examples of Gordon’s contributions
that examine front-and-center mainstream macroeconomics questions. The first is the
relationship between aggregate saving and investment. The second is the development of the
concept of the ‘natural rate of unemployment.’ The evolution of mainstream research on these
two questions played a critical role in overturning what had been, over the first two post-World
War II decades, a prevailing Keynesian/social democratic consensus, at both the levels of
analytic economics as well as economic policy. As the paper reviews, Gordon challenges the
analytic findings and policy implications of these perspectives at their core. Gordon’s own basic
premises and results are straightforward. He argues that, in fact, investment decisions, not
saving rates, are the main driver of economic activity in capitalist economies and that operating
capitalist economies at something akin to genuine full employment—i.e. in the range of 2 – 3
percent official unemployment—is a realistic goal. As such, these papers by Gordon contribute
significantly toward envisioning a post-neoliberal social structure of accumulation that is
committed to the egalitarian principles that were central to Gordon’s life work.
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INTRODUCTION
David Gordon was a rare combination. He was, at once, a highly creative economist with
an enormous range of interests, while also uncompromising in maintaining rigorous research
standards. He was focused equally on hard-core academic research and pressing policy issues.
He was also openly committed to the political left, with this commitment animating all his work.
He was a true pioneer in many areas. 1 In macroeconomics and economic history, Gordon
was the initial leader contributing to what he himself termed the “social structure of
accumulation” (SSA) mode of analysis. Gordon applied the SSA approach to understanding the
evolution of labor conditions and class conflict in the U.S., as well as, more broadly, the longterm trajectory of the U.S. and global economy. This framework enabled him to inject
institutional and historical richness to the literature on the long waves of capitalist development
as well as the related issues of macroeconomic crises under capitalism.
Distinct from, but still connected to, these macro-oriented questions, Gordon opened up
new thinking on the social determinants of productivity growth. Gordon’s starting point here
was the recognition that workers showing up at their jobs do not produce at uniform rates
regardless of working conditions. Gordon rather postulated that the wages workers receive and
their workplace conditions will significantly affect their level of effort. Correspondingly, a
major part of what business owners and managers do every day is try to elicit the maximum
effort from their employees at the lowest possible cost to themselves. Of course, these
workplace issues were explored by, among others, Karl Marx himself, when he developed the
distinction in Capital between “labor” and “labor power.” Gordon brought new attention to
these questions, through his original perspectives and modeling approaches.
Another distinctive feature of Gordon’s work was his keenness to dive into the most
important topics engaging mainstream economists and to inject explicitly left political economy
perspectives into these mainstream debates. Moreover, Gordon’s work in these areas deployed
the same technical tools that mainstream economists relied upon, in particular econometric
modeling. Almost unique among left political economists, Gordon was an excellent applied
econometrician. These skills proved indispensable with a large number of projects aimed at
challenging, on their own turf, the most basic presumptions of the professional mainstream.
In this paper, I focus on two important examples of Gordon’s contributions that examine
front-and-center mainstream macroeconomics questions. The first is the relationship between
aggregate saving and investment. The second is the development of the concept of the ‘natural
rate of unemployment.’ Without question, the evolution of mainstream research on these two
questions played a critical role in overturning what had been, over the first two post-World War
II decades, a prevailing Keynesian/social democratic consensus, at both the levels of analytic
economics as well as economic policy. Starting in the 1970s, the Keynesian/social democratic
1

An excellent collection of some of Gordon’s most significant papers in all of his areas of work is Gordon (1998).
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consensus was supplanted at the level of analytic macroeconomics by the interrelated
“monetarist,” and “new classical,” schools of thought, along with a somewhat more conventional
pre-Keynesian neoclassical framework. At the level of global policymaking, the
Keynesian/social democratic consensus was replaced by what has become known as
neoliberalism. Neoliberalism as a policy framework is built on the analytic foundations of
monetarism, new classical, and right-of-center neoclassical macro.
These transformations in the spheres of both analytic macro and macro policy have had
fundamental impacts globally, as I discuss briefly in what follows. Specifically, the idea that
high levels of aggregate saving are a primary driver of healthy economic growth led mainstream
economists to support measures that, in the interest of raising saving rates, would entail
reductions in mass consumption and sharp cuts in government social programs. The concept of
the natural rate of unemployment provided the justification for abandoning the goal of full
employment under capitalism, despite the fact that something close to full employment was
sustained in most advanced capitalist economies from roughly 1950 – 1970. Under the
neoliberal policy regime, high unemployment rates became justified as the only means of
preventing inflationary pressures from getting out of control. Overall, the ascendency of
monetarist/new classical/conservative neo-classical macro theory and neoliberal macro policy
have been the foundations for advancing austerity programs in both the advanced economies and
the developing world.
As I will review, Gordon challenges these analytic findings and policy implications at
their core. He presents extensive critical literature reviews as well as original econometric
findings regarding both questions. At the same time, Gordon’s basic premises and results
straightforward. He argues that, in fact, investment decisions, not saving rates, are the main
driver of economic activity in capitalist economies and that operating capitalist economies at
something akin to genuine full employment—i.e. in the range of 2 – 3 percent official
unemployment—is a realistic goal. As such, these papers by Gordon contribute significantly
toward envisioning a post-neoliberal social structure of accumulation that is committed to the
egalitarian principles that were central to Gordon’s life work.
SAVING, INVESTMENT AND MACROECOMIC ACTIVITY
Causal Saving vs. Causal Investment
In pre-Keynesian mainstream analysis, the saving rate was regarded as a central variable
determining the pace and level of overall activity. According to this perspective, high saving
rates produced an ample supply of credit at relatively low interest rates, providing the financial
wherewithal for the growth of investment. Correspondingly, low saving rates created a scarcity
of credit and high interest rates that discouraged new investment. James Meade aptly
characterized the pre-Keynesian model as one in which “a dog called saving wagged its tail
labelled investment,” (quoted in Bridel 1987a, p. 161).
A major thrust of the Keynesian revolution, of course, was to reject the notion that saving
determines the rate of investment activity through its impact on credit supply and the interest
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rate, and indeed, to establish the independence of investment from saving: to shift, again in
Meade’s words, to a model in which “a dog called investment wagged its tail labeled saving.” In
this Keynesian view, firms’ investment decisions are made on the basis of their profit
expectations. The interest rate at which they can borrow is only one factor, and probably only a
secondary one, in establishing investors’ profit expectations. More important, Keynes argued
that any growth of activity, initiated through investment spending and propagated through the
multiplier, would raise both the level of total income and, in particular, the level of saving. Two
major implications flowed from such reasoning: that saving is a passive variable, fluctuating
along with aggregate income, whose changes in turn are determined by the level of investment’
and that increases in investment are self-financing, in that, through the multiplier, investment
growth generates an amount of saving commensurate with a given increase in activity. As Joan
Robinson wrote in 1962, it is “the central thesis of the General Theory that firms are free, within
wide limits, to accumulate as they please, and that the rate of saving of the economy as a whole
accommodates itself to the rate of investment that they decree,” (pp. 82 – 83).
By the 1980s, what we may call the “causal investment” Keynesian framework had been
eclipsed in mainstream macroeconomics, with the “causal saving” perspective having been
restored to its pre-Keynesian hegemony. Moreover, this counterrevolution was not simply a
matter for high theorists to ponder. Focusing on the U.S. economy, two central macro policy
ideas flowed directly out of the causal-saving vs. causal-investment debate. The first was that
the private saving rate in the United States was too low to sustain a healthy economic growth
path—that U.S. consumers were, indeed, engaged in what two leading mainstream
macroeconomists at the time described as “collective profligacy,” (Bernheim and Shoven 1991).
The second was over the extent to which borrowing by the federal government “crowded out”
private investors from financial markets. These perspectives on insufficient saving by private
households and excessive borrowing by the federal government led to two major policy
conclusions: 1) Private consumption needed to be discouraged and private saving increased,
with increased taxes on individual consumption being the policy mechanism proposed to deliver
this outcome; and 2) Federal government spending needed to be curtailed.
In combination, these policy measures would amount to an austerity program for
everyone in the U.S. other than the rich. This is, first, because the non-rich consume a much
higher fraction of their income than the rich. A consumption tax would therefore fall
disproportionately on the non-rich. In addition, roughly 70 percent of the federal government
budget, in the 1980s and currently as well, consists of spending in three areas—pensions, health
care, and the military. None of the mainstream economists in the 1980s were proposing
significant cuts in the military budget, which was then, and remains today, virtually untouchable
politically. As such, the only remaining areas available in which to make large-scale cuts in the
overall federal budget would be with the federal pension and health-care programs supporting
the non-rich, including Social Security, Medicare and Medicaid. In short, the return of the
causal-saving perspective as a dominant idea in mainstream macroeconomics provided the
analytic legitimacy for attacking living standards for the U.S. middle-class, working people and
poor, and supporting the overall rise in U.S. income inequality that has persisted since the 1980s.
This was the prevailing analytic and policy environment in the U.S. when Gordon wrote
his two ambitious companion papers that revisited the causal-saving versus causal-investment
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debate, “Putting the Horse (Back) Before the Cart: Disentangling the Macro Relationship
between Investment and Saving” (1995), and “Must We Save Our Way Out of Stagnation”
(1996). The latter paper was published only months after Gordon’s tragic passing in March
1996. Of course, Gordon was by no means the first author to explore this topic from a heterodox
perspective. But he was one of the first to do so through in-depth econometric modeling, and in
particular through constructing econometric models that enabled direct comparisons between the
two competing perspectives. I focus here primarily on the 1996 paper, since it was Gordon’s
last contribution on this topic. This later paper provides the additional benefit that it was
published along with commentaries by two leading macroeconomists, the mainstream neoclassical Stanley Fischer and the heterodox Keynesian Steven Fazzari.
Gordon introduces the 1996 paper by describing the two kinds of arguments mobilized on
behalf of what he described as the “apparently self-evident proposition” of the causal-saving
perspective among mainstream macroeconomists.
First, the standard national-income accounting identity is marshalled to emphasize
the tightness of the investment-saving relationship. Assuming that net exports do
not play a crucial role in equilibrating national saving and investment, it follows
ex post that investment cannot increase without simultaneous and commensurate
increases in either private saving or the government surplus. Second, it is widely
observed that there is a close cross-national relationship between national
investment rates and national saving rates. This pattern has suggested to many
mainstream economists that an individual country cannot boost its investment
share without first permissively increasing its own net national saving rate (1996,
p. 96).
However, Gordon makes clear from the outset that, in fact, these two arguments actually
establish nothing about the causal relationship between saving and investment. As he writes:
The standard accounting identity does not tell us that we must first increase
saving before we can subsequently expand investment, merely that the two must
move together ex post. The relationship between net national investment and net
national saving, further, tells us only that they vary closely together across
countries, not that net investment rates in some countries are higher than in others
because net national saving rates in those countries are higher. Indeed, given
what little this raw material can tell us, one could just as easily argue that
conventional policy wisdom has stood economic behavior on its head. If
investment must equal saving ex post, it could logically be the case ex ante that
investment changes first and that saving comes subsequently into balance with
investment, rather than the other way around. And if investment and saving move
closely together over time and across countries, it could be the case that variations
in investments predetermine variations in saving rather than changes in saving
predetermining changes in investment (1996, pp. 96 – 97).
Gordon’s Saving/Investment Modeling Framework
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The aim of Gordon’s papers is to develop econometric tests through which we can
effectively evaluate the completing claims of the causal-saving vs causal-investment
perspectives. Gordon examines the question through four interrelated modeling
approaches. These include:
1. Replicating what were, at the time, the highly influential neoclassical models of
Martin Feldstein and co-authors on the intertemporal causal relationship between
saving and investment.
2. Developing his own “structuralist” macro model that synthesizes Keynesian and
Marxian features.
3. Within this structuralist model, pursuing single-equation tests for both
consumption and investment functions.
4. Specifying alternative systems of equations that test for simultaneity and several
possible channels of determination between saving investment. These systems of
equation tests include:
a. A synthetic atheoretical vector autoregression (VAR) model; and
b. A system of equations with behavioral features, based on his structuralist
model. Through this behavioral system of equations he then estimates the
impacts of alternative mainstream policy approaches as well as policy
approaches derived from his structural model to boost saving and
investment.
We now move now to considering each of these components of Gordon’s approach.
Replication of Feldstein models
In 1980, Martin Feldstein and Charles Horioka published a highly influential econometric
paper which examined the causal relationship between saving and investment. Feldstein and
Horioka’s test consisted of running regressions of the form:
(I/Y)i = α + β(S/Y)i
where I is domestic investment, Y is gross domestic product (GDP), S is national saving (private
plus government) and the i subscript indexes the various countries in the data sample. Feldstein
used a sample of sixteen industrialized countries. Saving and investment were measured both
net and gross of depreciation allowances (i.e. consumption of the existing fixed capital stock).
In the basic model, estimated by ordinary least squares (OLS) using data averaged over
the period 1960 – 74, the estimates of β were 0.89 using gross measures of S and I and 0.94
using net measures, with R2’s of 0.91 and 0.87 respectively. Feldstein and Horioka recognized
that the saving rate is an endogenous variable in a long-run growth process, and therefore, that
this endogeneity could bias OLS estimates of β. They therefore also ran the same regressions
under a two-stage least squares (2SLS) specification for the 12 countries for which sufficient
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data were available. The results of the 2SLS regressions were very close to those of the OLS
equations. Feldstein and Horioka interpreted these results as confirming the robustness of the
causal-saving perspective across a range of industrialized economies. Feldstein and Horioka
also interpreted them as demonstrating that national saving rates were more significant than
access to international capital markets in determining domestic investment rates.
The Feldstein/Horioka paper generated a large literature challenging their findings and
interpretations from a range of perspectives. One central issue in this literature was whether
Feldstein and Horioka gave sufficient attention to the dynamic adjustment process between
saving and investment, and specifically whether their model allowed for the possibility of the
causal arrow running in the opposite direction—i.e. with investment causing saving rather than
the other way around. That would mean specifying the saving variable as the dependent
variable on the left-hand side of the equation and investment becoming a right-hand side
explanatory variable.
These critiques led Feldstein, now writing with Philippe Bachetta, to explicitly address
this intertemporal causal relationship between saving and investment. Gordon describes the
Feldstein/Bachetta model as proposing “to estimate simple adjustment equations in which the
change in investment or saving varies in response to the previous year’s gap between
investment,” (1996, p. 102).
The Feldstein/Bachetta specification is as follows:
It/Yt – It-1/Yt-1 = do + d1(It-1 – St-1)Yt-1
and
St/Yt – St-1/Yt-1 = eo + e1(It-1 – St-1)/Yt-1
In describing the operations of this model, Gordon writes:
If investment is responsive to saving, we should find that an increase in the past
period’s gap (indicating an excess of investment) would cause investment to
decline, resulting in a negative (and significant) value for d1. If saving is
responsive to investment, we should find that an increase in the lagged gap would
boost saving, resulting in a positive (and significant) value for e1 (1996, p 103).
Gordon utilizes the Feldstein/Bachetta specifications to estimate a dynamic
adjustment process for the U.S. economy between 1955 and 1989. He considers the
dynamic relationship between saving and investment on a quarterly basis over a 6-year
period, totaling to 24 quarters. This contrasts with Feldstein and Bachetta’s data sample,
which is a pooled cross section across 23 OECD countries. Gordon argues that Feldstein
and Bacchetta’s data sample is flawed because it could potentially conflate temporary and
cross-national relationships.
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Gordon’s results with the U.S. data run contrary to those of Feldstein and
Bachetta. More specifically, Gordon finds that, over an initial 5 – 7 quarter period, the
cross-correlations between investment and saving—tested with both investment and
saving as leads and lags—show no consistent causality running either way. Saving and
investment are rather simultaneously codetermined within this relatively short time
frame. However, moving beyond this initial 7 quarters, Gordon finds that that the lagged
values of investment correlate to a substantially higher extent with future values of saving
than lagged values of saving have with future values of investment. As such, Gordon
concludes that while the short-term relationship between saving and investment is
codetermined, when we move beyond this roughly two-year time frame, causality
appears to be running primary from investment to saving.
Gordon’s Structuralist Model
Unlike Feldstein and Bachetta, Gordon does not consider the results of these
bivariate dynamic adjustment tests as providing anything more than suggestive
preliminary evidence concerning saving-investment causality. Gordon rather argues that
these results suggest the need for a framework that can explain both the simultaneous
determination of saving and investment within a relatively short time period, such as two
years, along with the longer-term causal dominance of investment over saving. This is
the framework that Gordon develops with his structuralist model, which builds from
features of both Keynesian and Marxian analytic traditions.
From the Keynesian tradition, Gordon’s structuralist model explores the channels
through which investment can autonomously stimulate output and saving. Gordon’s
model also recognizes, as another more Keynesian feature, that the financial system will
play a central role in establishing investment as the causal variable driving saving. This
is because, for private investors to pursue profit opportunities, there needs to be adequate
financing available for these investments to be undertaken at affordable borrowing costs.
As such, the financial system must be sufficiently flexible in its capacity to supply credit
so that the existing pool of saving at any given time does not act as a hard constraint on
investors pursuing profit opportunities. Coming primarily from the Marxian tradition,
Gordon’s structuralist model gives prominence to the influences of class and income
distribution in the simultaneous determination of investment and saving.
The basic intuition of the model is straightforward, even while the econometric
modeling can become complex, especially given that Gordon is committed to testing for
robustness through alternative empirical specifications. The first major feature of the
model is its two-class consumption function. “Worker” households need to spend most
of what they receive in wages to maintain their living standard. For a given level of
income, their consumption rate for worker households will be in the range of 90 to 95
percent of their income. Their household saving rate will be correspondingly low to
negligible—i.e. in the range of 5 – 10 percent, if that. By contrast, “Capitalist”
households receive income primarily from the financial assets that they own. The
capitalist households save most of their income through purchasing and accumulating
these financial assets.
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Given these two distinct sets of saving behavior between worker and capitalist
households’ saving rates, what would we anticipate with respect to aggregate household
saving? Assume first a given level of national income. With this given level of national
income, the overall level of household saving will tend to be relatively low when the
distribution of income is more egalitarian, given that workers’ saving rates are relatively
low. Correspondingly, still with a given level of national income, the economy’s
household saving rate will be higher when national income is skewed to the wealthy,
since capitalists and the rich will save a much higher fraction of their income than
workers.
But this straightforward dynamic is upended as soon as we relax the assumption
of a given level of national income. If we assume instead a rising level of national
income, the absolute amount of saving by worker households will increase along with
their rising level of income, even if the share of their income that they save remains
relatively low—i.e. even if their consumption rate remains fixed in the range of 90 – 95
percent. At this higher level of national income, the economy’s overall pool of saving
will therefore increase even under an egalitarian income distribution in which the saving
rate by worker households remains low.
This then brings us to the next crucial question: What will be the dynamic that
can raise the economy from a lower to a higher level of activity and therefore raise the
economy’s pool of saving even under a relatively egalitarian income distribution? At the
level of straightforward accounting, it will be the national income identity Y = C + I + G
+ NX (with Y as national income, C is aggregate consumption, I is private investment
and NX is net exports). But of course, we need to move beyond the accounting identity
to identifying the central behavioral relationships in the model.
Within a Keynesian framework, we assume that the consumption/saving rate will vary in
close correspondence with income levels, i.e. C = f(Y). This fixed relationship between
consumption and income levels will apply to both worker and capitalist households in Gordon’s
model. Since Gordon is focusing on the U.S. economy in these studies, he reasonably assumes
that the economy will not be geared toward an export-led growth approach. NX is therefore
going to be a relatively less significant factor in establishing changes in the U.S. economy’s
overall level of activity. Government spending is of course significant, at roughly 35 percent of
total spending in the U.S. economy, broken down to about 20 percent federal spending and 15
percent through state and local governments. But variation in G will generally follow in
response to changes in the level of private activity. This leaves I, the level of private investment
spending, as the critical private-sector channel through which overall activity will vary, and
specifically, through which the economy will move from a lower to a higher level of activity.
This means that a macro model that incorporates Keynesian features must focus on
explaining the factors that will influence private investment. Gordon postulates—drawing now
from both the Keynesian and Marxian analytic modes—that the main factor driving private
investment is capitalists’ expectations of profit, measured relative to the borrowing costs they
would incur to obtain the funds to undertake investments. Here as well, the forces influencing
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investment decisions will have ambiguous impacts, considered in combination. That is, at a
given level of national income, capitalists will be positively motivated to invest by a higher profit
share of total national income. But a higher level of demand—as measured with a higher
capacity utilization rate and associated with a more egalitarian income distribution—will expand
market activity. A higher capacity utilization rate can then mean higher absolute amounts of
profit for business, even if the capitalists share of national income—their profit share—is lower.
Gordon’s model shows how these countervailing factors, brought together as a whole,
can then manifest themselves through what Gordon observed—that investment and saving will
be codetermined over the short-term of approximately two years, with the economy’s level of
activity and distributional structure either held constant, or changing only modestly. But over the
longer-term, investment becomes the autonomous driver, either pushing the economy upward to
higher levels of activity or downward into recession.
Within this framework, Gordon tests saving, investment and net exports as a
function of capacity utilization, the rate of profit and the real interest rate. All three
explanatory variables do contribute to explaining both saving and investment, with high
utilization and profit rates both exerting positive pressure on investment, while rising
real interest rates will dampen investment but contribute positively, if modestly, to the
saving rate.
Simultaneous Equation Tests
As noted above, Gordon develops two types of simultaneous equation tests to
shed further light on the dynamic adjustment process between saving and investment. He
begins with an atheoretical vector autoregression (VAR) model. Gordon’s VAR model
includes seven variables that incorporate both the orthodox and structuralist perspectives.
These are: personal saving; government saving, business saving, nonresidential
investment, capacity utilization, after tax profitability and the 3-month Treasury bill rate.
To observe as fully as possible the interrelationships between these variables, Gordon
estimated the VAR equations with one to eight lags with each of the seven variables.
Through this specification, Gordon is able to observe the extent to which, for example,
changes in investment will impact the economy’s level of saving as well as the other five
variables in the VAR model 3 months later, 6 months later, 9 months later and so on up
until 2 years after the initial change in the investment level. Correspondingly, Gordon is
also able to observe how changes in the saving level will impact investment along with
the other five variables with these same lags of 3 months, 6 months, 9 months and so on.
The results of model are unambiguous. Focused on the saving/investment
relationship among the seven variables in the VAR model, Gordon finds that after 8
quarters, the relative impact of the change in investment levels on the level of personal
saving is more than 20 times greater than the relative contribution of changes in personal
saving levels on investment. Similarly, the contribution of a change in investment in one
time period to its own level in future time periods is roughly 10 times greater than the
impact of personal saving, business saving and government saving combined on
investment levels. Gordon concludes from these VAR tests that “investment is a
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relatively more predetermined variable in the VAR system than are any of the
components of net national savings.” (1996, p. 142).
The final set of exercises Gordon performs involve constructing a simple
structural macro model derived from his consumption, investment and net export
equations. He seeks to analyze interactions within this system of equations by
considering policy simulations associated with mainstream policy proposals and his own
structuralist approach to boosting saving and investment.
Gordon attempts four policy simulation exercises within this structuralist
simultaneous equation system, two each for the neoclassical and structuralist
perspectives. The neoclassical policy simulations involve a “saving windfall,” that is, a
change in personal saving propensities and a “consumption tax” that would reduce the
government deficit without reducing private saving. The two structuralist experiments
are a “productivity windfall” that would raise profitability without reducing wages and a
surge in “investors spirits” that would get reflected in a decline in long-term interest
rates.
The results show that the neoclassical and structuralist policy simulations are both
capable of increasing saving, but that the structuralist simulations are far more capable of
raising investment performance. As Gordon acknowledges, these tests may be biased
because the model was derived from his own theoretical framework. He therefore runs
the same four policy simulation exercises using the macro model developed by Ray Fair.
The results Gordon obtains working with the Fair model are similar to those he obtained
with his own structuralist model.
Assessing Gordon’s Results
Gordon’s results are persuasive in demonstrating the weak analytic foundations on which
the causal saving framework is based. It follows that these weak analytic foundations cannot
support the policy proposals that mainstream macroeconomists, particularly in the U.S., had
advanced based on this causal-saving framework, i.e. an austerity agenda targeted at raising taxes
to reduce mass consumption and cutting federal government spending on social programs,
including Medicare, Medicaid, and Social Security.
At the same time, one can raise questions about Gordon’s own model and results.
One set of questions concerns the role of interest rate variation in his model. Within the
orthodox model, the responsiveness of interest rates to saving rates is central—i.e. when
the pool of saving increases, interest rates will fall. This, in turn will induce investment.
In most causal investment models, starting with Keynes, the role of interest rate variation
as a determinant of overall economic activity is greatly diminished. However, in
Gordon’s single-equation investment function, the interest rate has consistently high
levels of statistical significance, and the magnitude of these impacts are high—
approximately equal to Gordon’s profit rate explanatory variable. Indeed, Steven
Fazzari, the discussant on Gordon’s 1996 paper with a more Post-Keynesian orientation,
commented that “in some ways Gordon’s results are good news for the neoclassical
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analysis that emphasizes relative price effects as the key transmission mechanism
between saving and investment,” (1996, p. 169).
Moreover, in Gordon’s structuralist policy experiment with his simultaneous
equation system, the factor inducing a surge in ‘investors’ animal spirits’ is a fall in the
interest rate spread, with long-term rates falling relative to short-term rates. But Gordon
does not provide a mechanism for explaining how this relative fall in the long-term rates
will result. Had Gordon lived beyond the publication of this 1996 paper, this would
certainly have been an issue that he would have been able to examine further and clarify.
A second concern is that Gordon does not explore in detail how the relationship between
saving and investment could potentially vary when the economy moves from conditions of high
unemployment to something approximating full employment. This is the point that Stanley
Fischer emphasizes in his comments on Gordon’s paper. Fischer writes:
In a closed economy with unemployment, an exogenous increase in investment
demand is likely to increase saving, while an exogenous increase in the demand
for saving would affect investment only by reducing the interest rate and thus
would have at most a small positive effect on investment. But in a fully
employed closed economy, an increase in investment demand could not in the
short run stimulate more output and therefore would increase investment only to
the extent that it increased the interest rate and thereby stimulated saving (1996,
pp. 161-162).
In fact, Gordon’s model does address the effects of moving from an under-employed to a
fully employed economy. His empirical investigation is over the five full business cycles
between 1955.4 and 1989.2. These five cycles, of course, incorporate fluctuations in the rate of
unemployment and capacity utilization. It is true that, within his full period, Gordon does not
explicitly attempt to distinguish between phases of unemployment versus periods of full
employment. However, he does explicitly control for the effects of labor market tightening by
including capacity utilization as a variable in his tests. The robustness of his findings, including
the consistent high level of significance for the utilization variable and the absence of significant
serial correlation, make clear that his results are robust relative to both the upward and
downward phases within any given business cycle.
But there is another, more basic point to consider here. It is that the very meaning of full
employment, or the non-accelerating-inflation-unemployment-rate (NAIRU) is a subject of
considerable controversy. It is likely that Gordon and Fischer would not have agreed on a
proper definition of full employment and, therefore, on how a transition from an underemployed
to a fully employed economy would impact the determinants of saving and investment over the
course of a single business cycle, or as a trend between multiple business cycles. In this regard,
it is important to highlight Gordon’s insistence that his model carries no presumption about
whether the economy will tend to full employment, even when operating at full capacity. This
because, in his view, considerations about labor supply are determined largely independently of
the economy’s rate of investment growth.
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It is to Gordon’s perspectives on the set of labor market issues considered within the
framework of the concepts of the Natural Rate of Unemployment and NAIRU that we now turn.
DEMYSTIFYING THE NATURAL RATE OF UNEMPLOYMENT
Gordon’s entire body of research work was deeply committed to understanding the life
conditions, experiences, and opportunities for working class people, focused primarily on the
U.S. working class. This is the background Gordon brought to his work on the “natural rate of
unemployment” and “non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment” (NAIRU). In the
interests of simplicity and clarity, I will refer in places to the NAIRU as the “inflation-safe
unemployment rate.
Gordon explored these issues carefully in two papers, “Six-Percent Unemployment Ain’t
Natural: Demystifying the Idea of a Rising “Natural Rate of Unemployment,” in 1987 and “The
Un-Natural Rate of Unemployment: An Econometric Critique of the NAIRU Hypothesis,” in
1988. Gordon makes clear, especially in the 1988 paper, that he considered these two papers to
be preliminary explorations. He had returned to these research questions at the time of his 1996
death. Indeed, the interconnections that he saw between issues around unemployment and the
“natural rate” and his subsequent work on saving and investment that I reviewed above was part
of his motivation for beginning to work again on the natural rate literature shortly before his
passing.
Mainstream Macro Abandons Full Employment
Gordon’s goal with these two papers is to vigorously challenge the core ideas emanating
out of the natural rate/NAIRU literature, as these ideas became ascendent starting with the initial
formulations in the late 1960s by Milton Friedman (1969) and Edmund Phelps (1967). As
Gordon discusses in his 1987 paper, it was on the basis of the natural rate concept that the
mainstream of the profession abandoned the commitment to building full employment
economies that had been a centerpiece of macroeconomic policy since the end of World War II. 2
This commitment to full employment was established as the central aim of post Wold
War II economic policy in the aftermath of the calamitous 1930s Great Depression, in which
unemployment rose to 25 percent in the U.S. and comparable, if not higher, levels in Western
Europe. The precise meaning of the term “full employment” was never fully agreed upon at this
time. But it is pertinent to recall the experience in the advanced economies—i.e., the member
countries of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development OECD—in the initial
post World War II decades. During the period 1950 – 69, the median unemployment rate among
the OECD economies was 2.1 percent. That was regarded at the time as a reasonable, and
evidently attainable, definition of a full employment economy. The roughly 2 percent of the
workforce that remained unemployed over this period were mostly “frictionally” unemployed
people—i.e. they were mostly between jobs, receiving job training or relocating.
Following Gordon, I will use the term “natural rate” to refer interchangeably between the initial conceptualization
by Friedman and Phelps and subsequent developments falling more explicitly under the NAIRU rubric.

2
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The U.S. never succeeded in pushing unemployment down to the median OECD level in
this period. U.S. unemployment averaged 4.4 percent between 1950 – 1969. Nevertheless, even
in the U.S., policymakers’ target was to keep unemployment no higher than the overall 4 percent
rate and preferably to push it lower. Thus, in the 1960s, the U.S. Labor Department defined “low
unemployment” as being 3 percent unemployment or less. In his 1987 paper, Gordon himself
posited an unemployment rate close to 3 percent as “meaningful full employment” and held that
this target was both “desirable and plausible.” Even when, as a result of government spending
on the Vietnam War, U.S. inflation began to rise moderately in the late 1960s, President Johnson
himself remarked that “if rising prices are a problem, they’re a lot better than a stagnant
economy and high unemployment.” 3
However, the commitment to full employment among mainstream economists eroded
rapidly in the early 1970s, diminishing to a near-vanishing point in subsequent decades. The
work of Friedman and Phelps was highly influential. But still more impactful was the sharp
increase in inflation that resulted from the two “oil shocks” in the 1970s—i.e. when the
Organization of Oil Producing Countries (OPEC) managed to nearly double the global price of
crude oil in 1973 and again in 1979. As a result, the overall U.S. inflation rate (CPI-U) rose
averaged 7.6 percent from 1974 to 1980. Inflation rose at similar rates throughout the OECD
economies over these years. This ushered in the era of “stagflation,” characterized by the
concurrent rise of inflation and unemployment, with unemployment between 1974 – 1980
averaging 6.9 percent in both the U.S. and throughout the OECD economies. 4
The mainstream of the profession had become convinced from this experienced that
higher and higher unemployment rates were required to tame inflation, and therefore that “full
employment” as it had been understood in the 1950s and 1960s was no longer a realistic policy
goal. This transition among economists is the starting point for Gordon’s work on this issue.
Thus, Gordon observed in his 1987 paper that:
The notion of “full employment” has become something of a joke among
mainstream economists, the sort of antiquarian curiosity one expects to find in
museum gift shops. It was once a fine idea, one hears, but we can hardly aspire to
such noble policy objectives in the present brittle condition of the advanced
economies (1987, p. 223).
Gordon explains that the profession had developed a range of explanations for the
implausibility of meeting the full employment objectives. But, as Gordon writes, “one of the
most crippling, a relatively recent entrant into the lexicon of economic apologetics, is the notion
of the ‘natural rate of unemployment,’” (1987, p. 224).
Holes in the Natural Rate Model

The figures and quotations in this paragraph along with related observations References to this and related
observations during this period are presented in Baker, Pollin, and Zahrt (1996).
4
Figures on U.S. and OECD inflation and unemployment from https://fred.stlouisfed.org/
3
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The concept of the natural rate is that there is in any economy at any given time an
unemployment rate at which labor- and product-market balance ensures neither an acceleration
nor a deceleration of unemployment. Thus, if unemployment begins to fall below this ‘natural
rate,’ inflation will begin to surge and, left to its own devices, continually accelerate. Since
accelerating inflation is understood to be highly undesirable, it means that the unemployment
rate cannot be allowed to fall below its “natural” rate.
Gordon argues that, in itself, this idea is “neither crippling nor insidious,” (1987, p. 224).
That is, if the “natural rate” is, is in the range of the rough 2 percent unemployment rate that
prevailed among the OECD economies from 1950 – 69, the idea is not problematic. What was
objectionable for Gordon was that, at the time he was writing, the natural rate was understood to
be well above that 2 percent threshold. Indeed, Gordon documented the rise of what the
economics mainstream defined as the natural rate from 4 and 6 percent over the 1970s and
1980s. Even at present, after 30 years in which the U.S. unemployment rate averaged 2.1
percent, the economy’s “long-term natural rate,” according to the Federal Reserve’s own
definition, is at 4.5 percent.
Gordon’s basic argument is that the mainstream perspective on the natural rate is
seriously deficient because “central factors in determining the relationship between
unemployment and inflation are left outside the core of the analysis,” (1987, p. 237). Gordon
emphasizes two elisions in the natural rate analytic framework. The first concerns the
relationship between wage growth and productivity growth. Within the natural rate framework,
businesses set prices as a markup relative to their unit labor costs with the aim of maintaining at
least a stable profit rate through their price markups. If wages and productivity grow together,
then businesses unit labor costs will remain stable. There will be no incentive for businesses to
increase their price mark-ups in order to maintain their profit rates. However, if wages rise
faster than productivity, then unit labor costs rise, and businesses will therefore become
motivated to raise prices in order to maintain their existing profitability level. Inflation is
expected to accelerate in this situation.
A key question within this framework is therefore how workers might be able, under
certain conditions, to bargain up wages faster than productivity is improving. The answer is
that, under low unemployment conditions, workers gain leverage to bargain up their wages.
Business owners are forced to accede to these higher wage demands because, in this low
unemployment rate economy, it would be otherwise difficult for the businesses to keep their
labor force and productive operations running smoothly. In these conditions, businesses then
attempt to cover their increased labor costs by raising their prices, thus shifting the burden of
their higher unit labor costs onto consumers in order to maintain their profitability level. This is
the basic explanation as to how low unemployment rates can lead to accelerating inflation.
Gordon points out that this logical chain focuses only on the relationship between wages,
unemployment and inflation. It ignores considerations of variable productivity growth, even
though, simply as a matter of accounting, changes in productivity growth factor in equally in
determining unit labor costs. Gordon says that mainstream economists ignore consideration of
variable productivity growth because they assumed productivity growth to be an exogenous
variable within this frame of analysis—that is, productivity growth is assumed to vary based only
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on the level of capital stock and on investments to upgrade capital stock. Contrary to this
mainstream perspective, Gordon draws on the extensive work he had done on the social
determinants of productivity in arguing that this mainstream framework is underspecified.
Gordon writes:
Managers and workers are people with warts and dreams; the character of their
relationships is just as likely to affect the intensity and effectiveness of their work
and planning as is the quantities of capital with which they work. Second, these
social determinants of productivity levels and growth are not exogenous to the
kinds of macro-economic processes with which they natural rate hypothesis is
concerned. If real-wage growth slows, for example, workers may reduce their
work intensity out of frustration. As inflationary instability renders economic
horizons cloudier and planning for the future more and more problematic,
managers similarly may make less and less determined or effective efforts to
improve the productivity of their current factors of production. As economic
problems develop in one quarter, in short, productivity growth rates may dampen
in another (1987, p. 240)
The second objection Gordon raises with the natural rate framework is with labor supply.
By definition, unemployment results from a surplus of labor supply over labor demand at a given
point in time. Within the natural rate framework, movements in the unemployment rate are
focused only on variation in labor demand. But Gordon argues, within the logic of the analysis,
that unemployment could also rise, due to a decrease in total labor supply as opposed to an
increase in labor demand. Gordon further notes that, in an inflationary environment, real wages
will stagnate or decline if nominal wages are not rising in step with price increases. This
situation, in turn, could produce an increase in labor supply, with workers attempting to raise
their total number of working hours to compensate for the cut in their real wage per hour.
Unemployment could therefore increase as a result. Gordon argues that this dynamic is not
likely to be self-correcting. As unemployment rises, other factors again held constant, real
wages could continue to stagnate or decline. This could force households to try to supply even
more hours to maintain their standard of living.
Gordon’s Alternative Model
In his 1987 econometric paper, Gordon fleshes out more specific factors that he says will
influence the dynamic between unemployment and inflation. He focuses on two sets of
relationships—wage-setting and price setting.
With respect to wage setting, Gordon argues that businesses attempt to set wages so as to
extract the maximum degree of effort from workers at the lowest possible cost. This ‘labor
extraction’ channel is one way in which Gordon introduces social determinants of variable
productivity into his model. Gordon postulates that this labor extraction effect will vary based
on two interrelated factors: 1) whether the workplace is unionized; and 2) the effectiveness of
labor disciplinary measures, given the broader bargaining environment. In other words, Gordon
is postulating that anything like a natural rate analytic framework needs to take account of how
intensively businesses will attempt to push workers and how much leverage workers will have to
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resist such efforts. Gordon argues that these factors will vary over time. This variation, in turn,
will impact the relationship between unemployment and inflation. With respect to price
determination, Gordon postulates that this will be impacted by variation in the competitive
environment and by how market conditions impact firms’ capacity to mark up prices over unit
labor costs.
Gordon incorporates specifications of these factors as explanatory variables in equations
with inflation and nominal wages respectively as dependent variables. In both sets of equations,
Gordon reports that the tight relationship between inflation, unemployment and nominal wages
declines significantly (i.e. their coefficient values decline), while the overall explanatory power
of the more fully specified equations increases relative to the bivariate specifications (their R2
values increase). Gordon explains his results as follows:
In the inflation equation, wages are only partly passed on for two main reasons:
when demand growth is rapid, firms limit price increases in order to hold onto or
expand their market shares; and when demand growth is slow, supply-side
bottlenecks develop which either reduce competitive pressure or increase
effective unit costs. In the wage-change equation, two factors seem to play the
largest role in moderating the effect of price changes on wage changes: 1) Firms
target wages are defined solely with respect to labor extraction strategies and not
with respect to product prices; while workers’ target real wage demands are likely
to moderate if recent real wage growth has been especially rapid; and 2) wages in
the union sector both appear to exhibit some inertia and are modulated by
fluctuations in the real wage share through “productivity bargaining,” (1988, p.
122).
Questions and Extensions with the Gordon Model
This work of Gordon on the natural rate, similar to his papers on saving and investment,
represented a major advance over the then prevailing orthodox models. This is true, in
particular, because Gordon’s model allows for the possibility that other variables will play a
significant role in establishing the relationship between unemployment and inflation.
Specifically, the influence of these additional variables in Gordon’s model, in addition to the
inflation and unemployment rates themselves, create the prospect that the inflation-safe
unemployment rate could be driven down, to a point that corresponds to something close to a full
employment economy, i.e. to an unemployment rate in the range of 2 – 3 percent.
That said, it will also be useful to address some concerns and explore some further
implications that emerge with Gordon’s work. These include the following:
Labor supply and inflation. Gordon is persuasive in arguing that variation in labor
supply should be brought into the analysis. However, within Gordon’s own example, it would
appear that labor supply increases resulting from eroding real wages would likely generate a selfcorrecting dynamic in terms of dampening inflationary pressures. This is contrary to Gordon’s
own argument. The logic is as follows: if inflation is eroding real wages, and people enter the
labor market to earn extra income to compensate for the deterioration of their real wages, the
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impact should be to lower real wages further as the labor supply expands. The unemployment
rate should correspondingly rise with the expansion of the labor supply. This would result in a
self-correcting dynamic, in that the decline in real wages and the rise in unemployment would
produce a reduction in inflationary pressures.
Oil price shocks. Gordon’s analysis underplays the role of supply shocks, and spikes in
oil prices in particular, as contributing to inflation and the movement of the natural rate of
unemployment itself. As noted above, the primary driver of inflation in the 1970s was the rough
doubling of oil prices in 1973 and again in 1979. That is, the 1970s experience with stagflation
was not primarily due to any aspects of the bargaining environment between workers and
business owners or general changes in businesses’ markup strategies. Gordon does take account
of the oil shocks in his analysis, by following the modeling approach of his brother Robert
Gordon, in distinguishing between a “no shock” versus what he terms a “non-acceleratinginflation shock-accommodating rate of inflation (NASARU).” But Gordon chooses to focus
primarily on “no shock” scenarios. As such, he does not examine carefully the extent to which
the oil price shocks created an inflationary inertia within the U.S. and global economies—that is,
the sharp spikes in oil prices feeding into the economy’s overall dynamic of both wage and price
setting. The impact of the combination of the oil price shocks and inertia were almost certainly
the most critical factors leading to stagflation in the 1970s. These developments were also
critical to mainstream economists concluding that inflation could be controlled only through a
rising natural rate.
Costs and benefits of inflation. As with the mainstream economists, Gordon does not
explicitly address one big question with respect to inflation—that is, what exactly are its overall
social costs and benefits under a range of alternative circumstances. The mainstream literature
proceeds almost uniformly under the assumption that inflation inflicts costs on the economy
without producing any benefits. But in fact, under a range of circumstances in which price
increases remain within a moderate level, inflation can be associated with both a more egalitarian
income distribution as well as more rapid economic growth. In fact, there is little evidence
showing that overall economic performance is harmed by moderate rates of inflation, if the
inflation is resulting from tight labor markets as opposed to supply shocks and inertia. This
conclusion was supported forcefully in research published in 1995 by Michael Bruno, then the
chief economist of the World Bank, and later to become Governor of the Bank of Israel.
Studying the relationship between inflation and economic growth for 127 countries between
1960 and 1992, Bruno and his colleagues found that average growth rats fell only slightly as
inflation rates increased to between 20 and 25 percent. Of particular note, Bruno found that
between 1960 and 1972—i.e. prior to the initial 1973 oil shock—economic growth on average
increased as inflation rose from negative or low rates to the 15 to 20 percent range. This is
because, as Bruno explains, “in the 1950s and 1960s, low-to-moderate inflation went hand in
hand with vary rapid growth because of investment demand pressures in an expanding economy,
(1995, p. 13).” 5

Bruno’s findings have been supported in more recent research, including Pollin and Zhu (2005) and Anwar and
Islam (2011). This most recent study also finds that allowing higher inflation rates in the framework of a growing
economy can contribute to reducing income inequality and poverty in developing countries.
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Given this body of evidence, it is critical that the costs and benefits of inflation—and how
these relative costs and benefits might change at lower or higher inflation rates—need to be
addressed as part of any critical assessment of the natural rate literature.
The centrality of class conflict. It is not surprising that Gordon’s papers recognize the
central role of class conflict in establishing what the natural rate would be at any given time.
The inclusion of unionization rates and the ability of businesses to raise labor intensity rates as
variables in his model stand in sharp contrast with the mainstream natural rate models, then and
now. Moreover, Gordon was prescient in incorporating these factors into his model, as their
significance became increasingly evident in the 1990s.
In fact, Gordon’s brother Robert Gordon did briefly acknowledge the issue of relative
class strength in a 1997 paper which attempted to explain why the natural rate/NAIRU was
varying over time. This issue was treated only as an aside in Robert Gordon’s paper which
otherwise focused on econometric issues. Nevertheless, Robert Gordon did observe the
following:
The two especially large changes in the NAIRU [i.e. inflation-safe unemployment
rate]...are the increase between the early and late 1960s and the decrease in the
1990s. The late 1960s were a time of labor militancy, relatively strong unions, a
relatively high minimum wage and a marked increase in labor's share in national
income. The 1990s have been a time of labor peace, relatively weak unions, a
relatively low minimum wage and a slight decline in labor's income share (1997, p.
30.
Even more pertinent, the central importance of class conflict in establishing the natural rate
was also recognized in the 1990s by then Federal Reserve Chair Alan Greenspan himself. Thus,
the journalist Bob Woodward’s paean to Greenspan published in 2000, Maestro: Greenspan’s Fed
and the American Boom, includes the following revealing passage:
The old belief held that with such a low unemployment rate workers would have
the upper hand and demand higher wages. Yet the data showed that wages
weren’t rising that much. It was one of the central economic mysteries of the
time. Greenspan hypothesized at one point to colleagues within the Fed about the
“traumatized worker”—someone who felt job insecurity in the changing economy
and so was accepting smaller wage increases. He had talked with business leaders
who said their workers were not agitating and were fearful that their skills might
not be marketable if they were forced to change jobs (2000, p. 168).
Greenspan openly acknowledged his “traumatized worker” explanation for the dampening
of inflationary pressures in his regular semi-annual testimony to Congress in July 1997. Saluting
the economy's performance that year as “extraordinary'” and “exceptional,” he remarked that a
major factor contributing to its outstanding achievement was “a heightened sense of job insecurity
and, as a consequence, subdued wages.”6
6

Greenspan's testimony can be found on the Federal Reserve site at
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What becomes clear is that Gordon’s deep background on issues of class conflict in
capitalist economies was the basis for him being able to develop an understanding of the natural
rate literature that was far more insightful than what mainstream researchers at the time had
produced. The empirical realities of “traumatized workers” that were startling to Alan
Greenspan therefore came as no surprise to Gordon. This was true, even while, as Gordon
himself recognized at that time, his published work on this topic was a starting point, but only a
starting point, for building more robust models of the dynamics between inflation and
unemployment.
CONCLUSIONS
Since the 1970s, mainstream macroeconomics has been guided by a few core theoretical
concepts associated with the monetarist/new classical counterrevolution and the pre-Keynesian
neoclassical framework that supplanted the Keynesian/social democratic consensus of the initial
post World War decades. This paper examines the contributions by David Gordon which
challenged two of these core theoretical concepts. The first was that increasing saving rates exert
causal influence over the growth trajectory of capitalist economies. This causal-saving
perspective runs exactly contrary to the Keynesian causal-investment macroeconomic framework
which, as Joan Robinson wrote was “the central thesis of the General Theory.” The second was
that unemployment rates must be maintained well above full employment in order to prevent
inflationary pressures from overwhelming the economy. This ‘natural rate’ proposition provides
the justification for abandoning the central policy aim of the initial Keynesian revolution, which
was to create a more egalitarian version of capitalism committed to genuine full employment.
Under the neoliberal social structure of accumulation that has dominated economic
policymaking in the advanced economies since the late 1970s, high saving rates were considered
a cornerstone for promoting economic growth. Within this perspective, relatively high levels of
aggregate private consumption as well as generous social spending programs discouraged both
private and public saving rates. Mass consumption and public social spending therefore had to
be cut in behalf of raising aggregate saving rates. Similarly, under the natural rate framework,
maintaining inflation rates at negligible levels was prioritized over achieving full employment.
Job opportunities for tens of millions of people were thereby sacrificed following from the this
tenet. The implementation of these neoliberal propositions throughout the advanced economies
has resulted in four decades of significantly slower average growth rates and sharp increases in
income inequality.
Many other researchers have advanced valuable critiques of both of these core
mainstream macro ideas, both at the time that Gordon was writing and in the subsequent 25
years. Still, as we have seen, Gordon injected original perspectives into this literature. He was
able to do this because of the breadth of his research program as well as his underlying
commitment to the left political economy project. As one clear case in point, Gordon’s
structuralist macro model grew initially out of his more historical and institutional work on social
structures of accumulation. In turn, his structuralist model became the centerpiece for his
www.bog.frb.fed.us.boarddocs/hh/1997/July/testimony.htm.
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econometric exercises testing the robustness of the causal-saving versus causal-investment macro
approaches. Similarly, his decades of work examining class conflict in workplaces and the social
determinants of productivity enabled him to recognize major elisions in the natural rate model.
These weaknesses of the natural rate model had gone almost entirely unremarked in the hundreds
of research papers on the topic produced by mainstream economists.
Gordon’s skills as an applied econometrician enabled him to produce the valuable
empirical findings that I have reviewed here. As Gordon himself acknowledged, the results of
his econometric exercises were by no means definitive in overturning either the causal-saving
model or the natural rate. But they did succeed in landing serious blows against both
propositions. As such, Gordon’s critical work on these mainstream macro issues cleared vital
space from which other researchers, especially those of us sharing his commitments to the left
political economy project, can continue to advance.
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